ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHY USING MAPLE

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An elliptic curve is one of the form: $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$ where the coefficients a and b are chosen from some field K. All of our work in this paper will be done with $K=GF(p)=<\mathbb{Z}_p,+,\times>$. We require that the cubic $x^3 + ax + b$ does not have repeated roots in \mathbb{Z}_p which is equivalent to the condition that $4a^3 + 27b^2 \neq 0 \pmod{p}$. As an example, consider the graph of: $y^2 = x^3 - 7x - 5$ over \mathbb{R} :



If we consider this elliptic curve over the field \mathbb{Z}_{13} , then we obtain a *finite* set of points: { (3, ±1), (6, 0), (7, ±9), (8, ±3), (11, ±1), (12, ±1) }. If we add to this set the so-called point at infinity, denoted by **O**, we obtain a set denoted by $E_{13}(-7,-5)$ which contains a total of 12 points. $E_{13}(-7,-5)$ can be made into an abelian (commutative) group. For a general elliptic curve E and prime p we have (see [3]): To begin we define: P + **O** = P for all P. Next, if $P_1 = (x_1, y_1)$ and $P_2 = (x_2, y_2)$ are points on **E** with P_1 , $P_2 \neq \mathbf{O}$, define $P_1 + P_2 = P_3 = (x_3, y_3)$ by:

- 1. If $x_1 \neq x_2$, then $x_3 = m^2 x_1 x_2$, $y_3 = m(x_1 x_3) y_1$, where $m = (y_2 y_1)/(x_2 x_1)$.
- 2. If $x_1 = x_2$ but $y_1 \neq y_2$. Then $P_1 + P_2 = \mathbf{O}$.
- 3. If $P_1 = P_2$ and $y_1 \neq 0$ then $x_3 = m^2 2x_1$, $y_3 = m(x_1 x_3) y_1$, where $m = (3x_1^2 + a) / (2y_1)$.
- 4. If $P_1 = P_2$ and $y_1 = 0$ then $P_1 + P_2 = \mathbf{O}$.

I now present a number of Maple procedures to do basic elliptic curve computations. All computations will be done modulo a prime p > 3:



1. ecnopts : Computes the number of points on $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$: ecnopts := proc(a, b, p) local f, fla, ct, i, xtm; with(numtheory) : fla := 0 : $f := x \rightarrow x^3 + a \cdot x + b$: ct := 0 : for i from 0 to p - 1 do xtm := modp(f(i), p) : if xtm = 0 then fla := 1 : fi; if legendre(xtm, p) = 1 then ct := ct + 1 : fi; end do; if fla = 0 then ct := 2 \cdot ct + 1 : else ct := 2 \cdot ct + 2 : fi; print (Total Points); return ct; end proc;

2. ecpoints: Produces a complete or partial list of points on $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$:

```
ecpoints := \mathbf{proc}(a, b, p, n)
   local f, fla, ct, j, jj, xtm, i, csqr, pointslist;
       with(numtheory):
  fla := 0 : j := 1 : jj := 0 : ct := 0 :
  f := x \to x^3 + a \cdot x + b:
  pointslist := []:
  for i from 0 to n do
   xtm := modp(f(i), p):
     if xtm = 0 then fla := 1: pointslist := [op(pointslist), [i, 0]]: ct
     := ct + 1 : fi;
           csqr := msqrt(xtm, p):
     if csqr \neq FAIL and xtm \neq 0 then pointslist := [op(pointslist),
     [i, csqr]: pointslist := [op(pointslist), [i, p - csqr]]: ct := ct
     +2:fi;
  end do;
 ct \coloneqq ct + 1:
print (Total Points);
return pointslist, ct;
end proc;
```



3. mdexpec(ba,e,n,a,b). Here ba = $[x_1,y_1]$. This program finds the value of e·ba = e· $[x_1,y_1]$ modulo n on $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b \pmod{n}$ using a form of modular exponentiation:

```
 \begin{aligned} mdexpec &:= \mathbf{proc}(ba, e, a, b, n) \\ \mathbf{local} \ d, m, ee; \\ \mathbf{global} z; \\ z &:= \left[\infty, \infty\right] : m := ba; ee := e: \\ d &:= \left[0, 0\right] : Array(d); \\ \mathbf{while} \ ee \neq 0 \ \mathbf{do} \\ d &:= \left[\operatorname{floor}\left(\frac{ee}{2}\right), ee - 2 \cdot \operatorname{floor}\left(\frac{ee}{2}\right)\right]; \\ \mathbf{if} \ d[2] = 1 \ \mathbf{then} \ ecsump(z, m, a, b, n) : z := sm; print(`z=`z) : \mathbf{fi}; \\ ee &:= d[1]: \\ ecsump(m, m, a, b, n) : \\ m &:= sm; \\ \mathbf{end} \ \mathbf{do}; \\ \mathbf{return}(z) \\ \mathbf{end} \ \mathbf{proc}; \end{aligned}
```

4. ecorder: Finds the order of $c = [x_1,y_1]$ in $E_{pr}(a,b)$ where $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$ and pr > 3 is a prime. The number of points in $E_{pr}(a,b)$ must be known to be n:

```
ecorder := proc(c, a, b, n, pr)

local t, aone, nm, F, i;

t := n : F := ifactors(n); nm := nops(F[2]) :

for i from 1 to nm do

t := \frac{t}{(F[2, i][1]^{F[2, i][2]})};

mdexpec(c, t, a, b, pr); aone := z;

while aone \neq [\infty, \infty] do

mdexpec(aone, F[2, i][1], a, b, pr); aone := z; t := t \cdot F[2, i][1];

end do;

end do;

return(`order is `,t); end proc;
```

5. ecsump : Finds the sum of points r and s on $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$ where $r = [x_1, y_1]$ and $s = [x_2, y_2]$:





 $ecsump := \mathbf{proc}(r, s, a, b, p)$ **local** xone, xtwo, xthree, yone, ytwo, ythree, inf, λ , A, B, tmp; **global** sm; with(numtheory) : xone := r[1]: yone := r[2]: xtwo $:= s[1]: ytwo := s[2]: inf := [\infty, \infty];$ if [xone, yone] = inf then sm := [xtwo, ytwo]: goto(12) : fi; if [xtwo, ytwo] = inf then sm := [xone, yone] : goto(12) : fi;xone := modp(r[1], p) : yone := modp(r[2], p) : xtwo:= modp(s[1], p) : ytwo := modp(s[2], p) : A := modp(a, p) : B:= modp(b, 2): if xone = xtwo and (yone = p - ytwo or ytwo = p - yone) then sm $:= inf: goto(12): \mathbf{fi};$ if xone \neq xtwo then tmp := $(xtwo - xone)^{-1} \mod p : \lambda$ $:= modp((ytwo - yone) \cdot tmp, p) : xthree := modp(\lambda^2 - xone)$ -xtwo, p): ythree := $modp((xone - xthree) \cdot \lambda - yone, p)$: sm := [xthree, p]ythree]: goto(12): **fi**; if xone = xtwo and yone $\neq 0$ then $tmp := (2 \cdot yone)^{-1} \mod p : \lambda$ $:= modp((3 \cdot xone^2 + a) \cdot tmp, p) : xthree := modp(\lambda^2 - xone)$ -xtwo, p): ythree := $modp((xone - xthree) \cdot \lambda - yone, p)$: $sm := [xthree, modp(xone - xthree) \cdot \lambda - yone, p]$ *ythree*] : *goto*(12) : **fi**; if xone = xtwo and ytwo $\neq 0$ then $tmp := (2 \cdot ytwo)^{-1} \mod p : \lambda$ $:= modp((3 \cdot xtwo^2 + a) \cdot tmp, p) : xthree := modp(\lambda^2 - xone)$ -xtwo, p): ythree := $modp((xone - xthree) \cdot \lambda - ytwo, p)$: sm := [xthree, where where models have a start of the sythree]: goto(12): fi; if xone = xtwo and yone = ytwo and yone = 0 then sm := inf: goto(12): fi; 12 : return (*sm*); end proc;

I now describe a basic form of elliptic curve encryption based on the ElGammal cryptosystem [5]. For this, I follow the discussion in [1]. We begin with a plaintext message M encoded as the x-coordinate of the point P_M which lies on the curve $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b \pmod{p}$. We choose a point G on the curve whose order n in $E_p(a,b)$ is a large prime number. Both $E_p(a,b)$ and G are made public. Each user (Alice and Bob) selects a private key n_A and n_B and forms the public keys $P_A = n_A G$ and $P_B = n_B G$. If Alice (A) encrypts P_M to send to Bob (B), she chooses a random positive integer k < n and sends Bob the ciphertext *pair* of points:

 $P_C = \{ kG, (P_M + kP_B) \}$. Upon receiving the ciphertext message P_C , Bob recovers the original plaintext P_M via the computation:

 $(P_M + kP_B) - [n_B (kG)] = (P_M + kn_BG) - [n_B (kG)] = P_M$.

Note that a cryptanalyst would know G and also kG (which appears in P_C), so if he could find k from this information, he could decode $P_M + kP_B$ (because he also knows P_B) as follows: $(P_M + kP_B) - kP_B = P_M$. Finding k from G and kG is the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem: $\log_G (kG) = k$ which is considered to be a computationaly





intractable problem for large values of k and a "generator" point G with large order n. The encoding and decoding schemes are implemented in Maple as:

 $ecencryp := \mathbf{proc}(pm, pb, ge, k, a, b, p)$ $\mathbf{local} \quad kg, kpb, pmkpb, pe;$ $mdexpec(ge, k, a, b, p); \quad kg := z; \quad mdexpec(pb, k, a, b, p);$ kpb := z; $ecsump(pm, kpb, a, b, p); \quad pmkpb := sm; pe := [kg, pmkpb];$ $\mathbf{return}(`Encrypted Point Is: `, pe); \quad \mathbf{end proc};$

ecdecryp := proc(kgpmkpb, nb, a, b, p) local pm, nbkg; mdexpec(kgpmkpb[1], nb, a, b, p); nbkg := z; nbkg[2] := modp(-1 · nbkg[2], p); ecsump(kgpmkpb[2], nbkg, a, b, p); pm := sm; return(`Plaintext Point Is: `,pm);end proc;

EXAMPLE 1: A naive approach:

We give an example of encryption and decryption using Maple along with the use of some of the supporting procedures written above for a small prime and a short message.

We use the prime p = 9883 and $y^2 = x^3 + 765 x + 871$. We encode the letters A – Z by the shift scheme: E = 1, F = 2, G = 3,... C = 0, D = 1. The message which Alice will send to Bob is "LIKE" which corresponds to plaintext ciphers as 8571. To check that 8571 is the x-coordinate of a point on the elliptic curve we define: $f(x) = x^3 + 765 \cdot x + 871$.

> with(numtheory);

nextprime(9876);

9883

 $f \coloneqq x \to x^3 + 765 \cdot x + 871;$

 $x \rightarrow x^3 + 765 x + 871$

Then modp(f(8571), 9883) gives 5791. Then msqrt(5791, 9883) produces the y-coordinate which is 3277: modp(f(8571), 9883);

5791

So our message point PM is [8571, 3277]. To find the order of the group E9883 (765, 871), we run ecnopts(765, 871, 9883) which gives 9827 :

ecnopts(765, 871, 9883);

9827 Total Points.

To see some of the actual points in E9883 (765, 871) we can use ecpoints. For example if we want to see the first (approximately) 40 points, we run:



ecpoints(765, 871, 9883, 40); 43 *Total Points:*

 $\begin{bmatrix} [0, 2688], [0, 7195], [3, 3998], [3, 5885], [4, 2091], [4, 7792], [5, 4051], [5, 5832], [7, 2813], [7, 7070], [9, 4340], [9, 5543], [15, 3743], [15, 6140], [17, 4136], [17, 5747], [19, 2768], [19, 7115], [20, 8434], [20, 1449], [21, 3325], [21, 6558], [23, 3612], [23, 6271], [24, 6413], [24, 3470], [26, 7667], [26, 2216], [27, 203], [27, 9680], [28, 253], [28, 9630], [32, 9217], [32, 666], [34, 340], [34, 9543], [36, 3121], [36, 6762], [37, 8184], [37, 1699], [39, 2604], [39, 7279], [<math>\infty, \infty$]]

For a base point G we choose a random x, $0 \le x \le 9883$. For example, if x = 7 then modp(f(7), 9833) gives 6569 and then msqrt(6569, 9883) yields the y-coordinate which is 2813:

modp(f(7), 9833);

6569

msqrt(6569,9883);

2813

Our prospective G is [7, 2813]. Next we find the order of G in the group E9883 (765, 871) by running ecorder([7, 2813], 765, 871, 9827, 9883) which produces "9827 is the order":

ecorder([7, 2813], 765, 871, 9827, 9883);

9827 is the order

If Bob's secret key is nB = 873, then his public key is PB = nBG, so that: $PB = 873 \cdot [7, 2813]$. For this computation we use: mdexpec([7, 2813], 873, 9883, 765, 871) to obtain PB = [7516, 1555] which is Bob's public key: mdexpec([7, 2813], 873, 765, 871, 9883);

[7516, 1555]

If Alice's random number k (which she selects) if k = 2477, then the encrypted message which Alice sends to Bob can be obtained by: ecencrypt([8471, 3277], [7516, 1555], [7, 2813], 2477, 765, 871, 9883). This produces the ciphertext pair: PC = [[4225, 3276], [27, 203]]:

ecencryp([8571, 3277], [7516, 1555], [7, 2813], 2477, 765, 871, 9883);

Encrypted Point Is: [[4225, 3276], [27, 203]]

Now Bob may decrypt PC by using ecdecryp(kg, pmkpb, nb, a, b, p) which in our example is: ecdecryp([4225, 3276], [27, 203], 873, 765, 871, 9883). This outputs the plaintext point PM as [8571, 3277]:

> ecdecryp([[4225, 3276], [27, 203]], 873, 765, 871, 9883);

Plaintext Point Is: [8571, 3277]

So the message is in the x-coordinate, which is 8571 which we map back into "LIKE".

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We now produce a somewhat more sophisticated approach which will handle much larger primes. For this, we will need a number of additional procedures.

```
numtopointnew := \mathbf{proc}(x)
 local kappa, xp, c, yp, j;
 global shift;
 shift := [op(shift)];
 kappa := 2^8; j := 0;
if p - x > kappa then
for xp from x + j to x + kappa - 1 do
 c \coloneqq xp^3 + a \cdot xp + b \mod p;
 yp := numtheory[msqrt](c, p);
   j \coloneqq j + 1;
if yp \neq FAIL then
  shift := [op(shift), j-1];
    return [modp(xp, p), yp]
fi;
od;
else
for xp from x to x – kappa – 1 do
 c := xp^3 + a \cdot xp + b \mod p;
 yp := numtheory[msqrt](c, p);
j := j - 1;
if yp \neq FAIL then
  shift := [op(shift), j + 1];
   return [modp(xp, p), yp]
fi;
od;
fi;
print("Kappa Value Too Small. Please Increase Kappa Value.");
 return FAIL
end proc;
```

```
sendmessagenew := proc(T)

local i, pl, c, C, shift;

global ii; shift;

C := []; ii := 1; shift := [];

for i from 1 to nops(T) do

pl := numtopointnew(T[i]);

c := ecencrypt(pl, pb, G, k, a, b, p);

ii := ii + 1;

C := [op(C), c];

end do;

return (C);

end proc;
```





```
receivemessagenew := proc(C)

local T, t, i, pl, decipher2, decipher3;

global shift, pla;

pla := [];

for i from 1 to nops(C) do

pl := ecdecrypt(C[i], nb, a, b, p);

pl[1] := pl[1] - shift[i];

pla := [op(pla), pl[1]];

od;

decipher2 := convert(pla, base, p, 256);

decipher3 := convert(decipher2, bytes);

return(decipher3);

end proc;
```

Example 2: To illustrate the use of these procedures, we will use the NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) standard curve called P-192 along with the suggested base point and parameters for this curve (see [4]).

```
:= 62771017353866807638357894232076664160839087003903^{\circ}24961279;
```

x

p

```
:= 60204628237568865675821348058752611191669897663688 4684818;
```

```
:= 17405033229362203140485755228021941036402348892738
6650641;
```

b

y

```
\coloneqq 24551555460089438177402939151974517847691080581611 \\91238065
```

 $a \coloneqq -3;$

G := [x, y];

We now generate random values for na, nb and k as follows:

```
tmp := rand(1..10^{60});
na := tmp();
na
:= 57834376259448403629201036940943660606026869030186
6988470278
tmp := rand(1..10^{60});
nb := tmp();
nb
:= 60255708180563605299942785352636293380239969936206
```

```
3918388386
```

$$tmp := rand(1..10^{60});$$

$$k := tmp();$$

$$k$$

$$:= 11280323911963475536015712010189151448438158038447$$

$$8933592666$$

We find Bob's public key:

```
pb := mdexpec(G, nb, a, b, p);
[
294101517035892746266140741872855505275489857101040842
1892,
336185249762276871910174017961999048611977575502150062
3681]
```

We now illustrate the encrypting/decrypting process:

plaintext := "The derivative of a sum is the sum of the derivatives." "The derivative of a sum is the sum of the derivatives." List1 := convert(plaintext, bytes); [84, 104, 101, 32, 100, 101, 114, 105, 118, 97, 116, 105, 118, 101, 32, 111, 102, 32, 97, 32, 115, 117, 109, 32, 105, 115, 32, 116, 104, 101, 32, 115, 117, 109, 32, 111, 102, 32, 116, 104, 101, 32, 100, 101, 114, 105, 118, 97, 116, 105, 118, 101, 115, 46]

```
List2 := convert(List1, base, 256, p);
```

57461091466381879599536465659218644030600641011860143(7734, 238977468639178451336949567475222274321146054119956738 2198, 51073158375796]

shift := [];

[]

E := sendmessagenew(List2)





 $\begin{bmatrix} [[1657433696293371163950290411024802917105713189970700205212, 2155149311015027218709019957655766718896057190155548710953], \\ [5810511978268436668741571084885795042166817139201299570958, 688331379519775905694374186455965492813194229483493061219]], \\ [[1657433696293371163950290411024802917105713189970700205212, 2155149311015027218709019957655766718896057190155548710953], \\ [3159249255928444008594902209610843764609197279079917779019, 2129016347661636705198079094152737281882871951427132209441]], \\ [[1657433696293371163950290411024802917105713189970700205212, 2155149311015027218709019957655766718896057190155548710953], \\ [[1657433696293371163950290411024802917105713189970700205212, 2155149311015027218709019957655766718896057190155548710953], \\ [[4902904373743729636039029440553173255442296616603406481973, 3187355615138225075483959216105401452196286367987227195969]]]$

receivemessagenew(E);

"The derivative of a sum is the sum of the derivatives."

References

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